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Abstract
According to Engineer and Shi (1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003),
the double coincidence of wants problem seems to be not essential to rationalize the
use of money in a search theoretic framework. This paper analyzes an endogenous
price search model of money where there is universal double coincidence of wants.
The existence of a monetary equilibrium depends, essentially, on the asymmetry
in the role played by economic agents in the exchange and production processes.
In particular, entrepreneurs are assumed to produce a xed amount of a divisible
consumption good by means of labour services provided by workers. Entrepreneurs
can o¤er a co-operative (barter) contract or a monetary contract to workers. Under
the co-operative contract real wages are determined in the labour exchange sector,
while in the monetary regime real wages are determined in the commodity exchange
sector. The monetary contract is proved to be an equilibrium strategy provided that:
(i) the workers labour disutility is su¢ ciently high and/or (ii) the entrepreneurs
bargaining power in the commodity market is su¢ ciently large relative to their
bargaining power in the labour market. The rationale for money comes from the
fact that entrepreneurs use it as an instrument to maximize their output share.
JEL code: D 78, E 40
Keywords: Money, Search, Double Coincidence, Bargaining
1 Introduction
The key feature used to motivate the existence of a monetary equilibrium, in the standard
search theoretic analytical framework1 (Kyiotaki and Wright, 1991, 1993), is the the
well known double coincidence of wants problem. According to the classical Jevons
I would like to thank all the participants to the European Workshop in Monetary Theory, held in
the University of Rome Tor Vergata 27-28 october 2006, and in particular Aleksander Berentsen, Jean
Cartelier, Marcello Messori, and Christopher Waller for their useful observations on a previous version
of this paper. The usual disclaimers apply.
yE-mail: nicola.amendola@uniroma2.it, Tel +39 (06) 72595730
1For an extensive survey on the search theoretic approach to the foundations of monetary theory see
Rupert et al, 2000 and Shi, 2006
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argument, money emerges as an equilibrium transaction strategy because it allows to
relax the double coincidence of wants requirement and, by this way, to reduce the mean
waiting time to achieve the desired allocations.
More recently, however, some authors questioned that the double coincidence prob-
lem is essential to the existence of a monetary equilibrium. Engineer and Shi (1998) and
Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003) prove that, in a search model with imperfectly transfer-
able utility and demand asymmetries, the use of money can improve on the equilibrium
allocations even if there is a universal double coincidence of wants. The asymmetry in
bargaining across matches is at the core of Engineer and Shi (2001); money can be valued
in equilibrium provided that it o¤ers adequate bargaining terms relative to real assets.
The main aim of this paper is to show that the existence of a monetary equilibrium
can be also obtained introducing asymmetries in the exchange and production structure.
In particular, a search theoretic model with universal double coincidence of wants is
analyzed where, in contrast to the prevailing literature, production can not be carried
out by a single agent, but is modelled as an exchange relationship between entrepreneurs
and workers. Entrepreneurs can produce a consumption goods by means of labour
services provided by workers. Therefore, under the no auto-production assumption, a
complementary relationship between entrepreneurs and workers emerges, togheter with
a strong asymmetry in the role played by the two types of agents in the exchange
and production process. Entrepreneurs supply consumption goods and demand labour
services, while workers supply labour services and demand consumption goods.
Provided that there is no specialization on production and consumption and there
are no real endowments at the beginning of the story, the main strategic problem faced
by the entrepreneurs is how to carry out production. According to the rst and more
immediate solution, entrepreneurs and workers bargain over their respective output share
and then realize production by means of workers labour services and entrepreneurs
skills. However, there is another possible strategy available to the entrepreneurs: they
can borrow from a bank a money unit which can be used to purchase labour services
and to produce. After this stage, the entrepreneurs can go to an exchange sector where,
according to a bargaining process, they can sell a fraction of their output against money,
consume the residual fraction and pay back money to the bank. In other words, the
entrepreneurs can decide to extend the transaction sequence contracting the real wage
in the exchange sector instead of in the production sector.
Following the denition introduced by Keynes (1933), the rst strategy characterizes
a co-operative economy, while the second one can be easily interpreted as the exchange
and production strategy prevailing in a monetary economy.
There are at least three di¤erences between a co-operative and a monetary economy,
which prove to be relevant for the monetary foundationsproblem: (i) the bargaining
process between workers and entrepreneurs takes place at di¤erent stages, (ii) the bar-
gaining process between workers and entrepreneurs takes place in di¤erent sectors, (iii)
the bargaining process involves di¤erent entrepreneurs and di¤erent workers.
According to point (i), in a co-operative economy entrepreneurs and workers bargain
over the output shares before that production is actually realized while, in a monetary
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economy, the bargaining process takes place in a successive stage, namely in the exchange
sector. As long as there is a positive labour disutility cost, the di¤erence concerning the
timing of the bargaining process has an interesting implication. As a matter of fact, in
a monetary economy the entrepreneurs bargain with workers who are free from labour
disutility costs. Because of that, in a monetary equilibrium the workers can be willing
to accept a real wage lower than the real wage to be paid by an entrepreneur who decide
to deviate, o¤ering a co-operative arrangement. There is a labour disutility e¤ect that
could prevent potential deviations from the monetary equilibrium.
With reference to point (ii), we observe that in a co-operative economy entrepreneurs
and workers bargain directly in the production sector. On the contrary, in a monetary
economy agents face a longer transaction sequence, and real wages are determined in
the exchange sector, where entrepreneurs and workers appears as sellers and buyers
respectively. There are no general reasons to assume that the entrepreneursbargaining
power in the exchange sector is equal to their corresponding bargaining power in the
production sector. If the rst one is su¢ ciently large relative to the second one, another
argument in favour of the monetary equilibrium comes to the fore.
Regarding point (iii), it should be noted that, in a co-operative economy, production
and exchange activities constitute a self-contained process; the same couple of entrepre-
neurs and workers produce the consumption good and consume it according to a pre-
viously dened sharing rule. On the opposite, in a monetary economy the production
and exchange process is no more a self-contained process. Because of the decentralized
search structure, a single worker bargains over quantities with an entrepreneur who is
necessarily not the same entrepreneur who hired him in the previous period; the pro-
duction couple is always di¤erent from the exchange couple. As a consequence, from
the entrepreneursperspective, money is a device to avoid a commitment on quantities
in the production sector whenever, because of point (i) and (ii), it would be better to
bargain over quantities in the exchange sector.
Eventually, it should be emphasized that in our analysis the problem of the existence
of a monetary equilibrium is logically separated from e¢ ciency considerations. The ra-
tionale for money depends on what money can do for a specic class of agents, namely
the entrepreneurs. The monetary economy is clearly ine¢ cient, because it extends the
transactions chain without producing any social advantage. On the other hand, mone-
tary transactions could modify the surplus distribution in favour of the entrepreneurs.
If the e¢ ciency loss is more than compensated by the gains from surplus distribution,
the entrepreneurs would prefer to produce in a monetary economy. Entrepreneurs may
use money as an instrument to maximize their output share.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic
model, where a positive labour disutility cost is assumed and the bargaining weights are
constrained to be homogeneous across sectors and agents; this allows us to explore the
implications of point (i). In order to analyze point (ii), Section 3 extends the previous
model allowing for heterogeneous bargaining weights. Section 4 is dedicated to the
e¢ ciency property of the monetary equilibrium. Conclusions follow.
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2 The Model
The economy2 is populated by a continuum of agents of unitary mass and time is con-
tinuous and goes forever. Population consists of E entrepreneurs and 1   E workers.
Entrepreneurs can produce one unit of a divisible consumption good by means of labor
services. Workers are not able to directly produce consumption goods, but they can
provide labour services to the entrepreneurs. Therefore, there is a technological comple-
mentarity between entrepreneurs and workers, and production, as well as consumption,
implies an exchange activity between the two types of agents. Labour services are indi-
visible and homogeneous across workers and entail a disutility cost  < 1.
Entrepreneurs and workers preferences are represented by a linear utility function
u (Q) = Q, where Q is the fraction of the output consumed. Consumption is necessary
in order to produce and to work again3 and there is no specialization on production and
consumption. Hence, there is always a double coincidence of wants between entrepre-
neurs and workers and every possible explanation for the existence of money should lie
elsewhere. We also assume that there are no real endowment at the beginning of the
story.
With regard to the matching technology, we assume that agents meet pairwise accord-
ing to a Poisson process with a constant parameter  normalized, for the sake of notation,
to one. However, in order to emphasize the role of the asymmetric exchange structure,
we choose to minimize search frictions adopting an endogenous matching framework
without commitment4. The endogenous matching rule can be conditioned on agent type
while, within types, meetings are at random.
In the above framework, entrepreneurs can carry out production following two pos-
sible strategies: (i) when an entrepreneur meets a worker he o¤er him the access to a
bargaining process over the sharing rule of the consumption good. The outcome of this
bargaining process is identied by the symmetric axiomatic Nash bargaining solution
with zero treath point. After this stage, the worker provides labour services, production
is realized and the two agents split the consumption good according to the previously
dened bargaining solution; (ii) an entrepreneur can applies a bank for an indivisible
unit of at money. Then, when he meets a worker, he can o¤er him money against labour
services. If the worker accepts, the entrepreneur produces the consumption good and
goes to an exchange sector where, according to a symmetric axiomatic Nash bargaining
solution with zero treath point, he sells a fraction of his consumption good to a worker
against money. At the end of this stage he can repay the bank and come back to the
initial position.
Workers do not have access to the credit system, and the nancing cost is equal to
zero. Moreover we assume that the bank can impose an innite default penalty, so that
entrepreneurs have always a positive incentive to give back money.
We refer to strategy (i) as a co-operative contract, while strategy (ii) could be easily
2The structure of the model is largely borrowed from Amendola (2008).
3This implies that even if there is no phisical obstacle to storing consumption goods, agents cannot
store consumption goods for more than a single exchange session.
4See Corbae et Al. (2002) and Corbae et Al. (2003)
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interpreted as amonetary contract. Entrepreneurs decide about the type of contract they
will o¤er to workers, while workers can only decide to accept or reject the entrepreneurs
o¤er.
The symmetric axiomatic Nash bargaining solution is assumed because of its unique-
ness and analytical tractability. However this solution can be always interpreted as the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a properly dened sequential bargaining
game (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986). For instance, the bargaining protocol
behind the co-operative contract can be described as follows: at the rst stage of the
game, Nature randomly selects, with equal probability, one of the two players. The se-
lected player can o¤er a sharing rule for the consumption good unit. If the other player
accepts the game stops, if he refuses the game continues and, after a time interval t,
Nature randomly selects, with the same probability distribution, a new player. Agents
can exit at any stage of the game, but they can not meet other agents during t. It is
possible to prove that the sequential game above described has a unique subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium and that, at the equilibrium, the rst proposal is always accepted.
Moreover, as the recontracting time lag t approaches to zero, the equilibrium outcome
of the game approaches to the symmetric axiomatic Nash bargaining solution with zero
treath point.
In the rest of the paper, we will focus only on steady state and pure strategy equi-
libria. Our main purpose is to prove that the monetary contract could be a sustainable
equilibrium, i.e. if all entrepreneurs o¤er a monetary contract, no entrepreneur has
incentives to o¤er a co-operative contract.
2.1 Endogenous Matching and Steady State Distribution
Let us assume that entrepreneurs decide to o¤er a monetary contract and that workers
are willing to accept it. There are four possible states for our economy: entrepreneurs can
be in the production sector or in the exchange sector; in the rst case they are endowed
with a money unit while, in the second case they are endowed with a consumption good
unit. We refer to the rst state as state p = producer and to the second one as state s =
seller. Symmetrically, workers can be in the production sector, endowed with potential
labour services, or in the exchange sector endowed with a money unit. We refer to these
states respectively as state w =active worker and state b = buyer.
In an endogenous matching framework without commitment agents decide who want
to meet according to an optimal matching rule. In the our specic setup the optimal
endogenous matching rule is the following one: (a) active workers decide to meet pro-
ducers an viceversa; (b) sellers decide to meet buyers an viceversa. Any other possible
rule is sub-optimal entailing no exchange opportunities.
According to the previously dened matching rule, meeting probabilities are the
following:
psb = min

nb
ns
; 1

; pbs = min

ns
nb
; 1

ppw = min

nw
np
; 1

; pwp = min

np
nw
; 1

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where ni i = b; s; p; w denotes the agents distribution among states and pij is the
probability that a type i agent meets a type j agent. Meeting probabilities are regulated
by a short side rule.
We will restrict our attention to steady state equilibria and we assume 1   E  E;
the number of workers is equal or larger than the number of entrepreneurs. The meaning
of this restriction is quite simple: we choose to analyze an economy in which there is a
structural excess supply of labour or, at least, a zero excess supply.
According to the above meeting probabilities, steady state conditions are:
nbmin

ns
nb
; 1

= nwmin

np
nw
; 1

(1)
nb + nw = 1  E  E = np + ns (2)
nb = ns (3)
Condition (3) comes from the fact that in the exchange sector there is always a ow-
in equilibrium and, as a consequence, there is always a stock equilibrium5. From (2) and
(3) we have nw  np: Hence, from (1) it follows ns = np: The steady state distribution
is:
ns = np = nb =
E
2
; nw =
2  3E
2
(4)
while
pwp = min

np
nw
; 1

=
E
2  3E =  (E)
and
psb = pbs = ppw = 1
Note that 1 E > E implies  (E) < 1; the probability that an active worker meets
a producer is strictly less than one. On the contrary, if 1 E = E,  (E) = 1 and there
are no short sides in the production sector. With all the due caveats, we can take  (E)
as a proxy for the unemployment rate, referring to a  (E) = 1 economy as to a full
employment economy.
2.2 Optimality Conditions
Given the steady state distribution dened in (4), we can write down the following
standard Bellmann equations for a monetary equilibrium:
rVp = Vs   Vp (5)
rVs = Vp   Vs +Qm (6)
5Producers go to the exchange sector if and only if they meet an active worker and viceversa. This
implies that there is always a ow-in equilibrium between producers and active worker, as for every
producers coming into the exchage sector there is always a corresponding active worker coming into
the same sector. However, if the above condition holds true, the only possible steady state distribution
consistent with the initial condition n0s = n
0
b = 0 (no real endowments assumption) requires ns = nb:
6
rVw =  (E) [Vb   Vw   ] (7)
rVb = Vw   Vb + 1 Qm (8)
where Vj ; j = s; b; w; p is the value function of a state j agent; r > 0 is the intertemporal
rate of preference,  is the working disutility and 1 Qm is the quantity of the consump-
tion good exchanged against one unit of money. Momentarily, we take Qm 2 [0; 1] as an
exogenous value; we will determine the equilibrium value of Qm in the next section.
The interpretation of conditions (5)-(8) is the usual one. The ow return of state j
must be equal to the gain from trade in state j. For instance, the ow return of an active
worker must be equal to the probability  (E) with which he meets a producer times
the gain from subscribing a monetary contract, where this last one is given by the value
function of becoming a buyer Vb minus the value function of being an active worker Vw
minus the working disutility :
However, because of the non-negativity constraint on the value functions, not all the
possible values of Qm are consistent with the optimality conditions. From equations
(5)-(8) we derive the following producersparticipation constraints:
rVp  0 (9)
Vp   Vs +Qm  0 (10)
Resorting once again to the optimality conditions, we obtain:
rVp =
Qm
r + 2
 0 for every Qm 2 [0; 1]
and
Vp   Vs +Qm = Qm (r + 1)
r + 2
 0 for every Qm 2 [0; 1]
Hence, participation constraints (9) and (10) are always satised. The same is not true
with reference to the workersparticipation constraints which are the following ones:
Vb   Vw     0 (11)
Vw   Vb + 1 Qm  0 (12)
Remembering the optimality conditions, we can write the two previous constraints in
the following form:
Qm  1   (1 + r) = Qm (13)
Qm  1   
r + 
= eQm (14)
First of all we observe that eQm > Qm: This means that given constraint (13), constraint
(14) is never binding. However, we need also Qm  0 and this last condition is satised
if and only if:
  1
r + 1
(15)
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We conclude that if the constraint (15) holds true, a feasible monetary solution Qm must
belong to the subset

0; Qm

, where 1  Qm can be interpreted as a sort of reservation
wage. It should be noted that the reservation wage is increasing in  and r, where this
property has a quite obvious interpretation. If the working disutility increases there must
be a corresponding increase in the reservation wage. If r increases, the cost of delaying
consumption increases and this cost must be compensated by a higher reservation wage.
2.3 Price Theory
The value Qm is a monetary price and must be determined endogenously as a result of
a bargaining process between buyers and sellers. Following Trejos and Wright (1995),
we assume that this bargaining process leads to an axiomatic rational expectation Nash
bargaining solution (reNBS) with zero threat point. In order to characterize the reNBS
solution we follow a two step procedure. First of all we identify the equilibrium quantity
qm determined in a single match. This quantity solves the following problem:
max
qm
(Vp + qm) (Vw + 1  qm) (16)
s.t. Vw   Vb + 1  qm  0
where Vp = Vp (Qm), Vw = Vw (Qm) ; Vb = Vb (Qm) and Qm is the quantity that the
single agent expects to obtain on the market: The solution of problem (16) determines an
optimal reply function qm = f (Qm) : However, under the rational expectation hypothesis
Qm = qm; so that a xed point for f (Qm) identies the reNBS Qm:
We dene an admissible monetary equilibrium a list (Vi; i = p; w; b; s;Qm > 0) satis-
fying the following conditions: (i) qm = Qm = Qm solves the bargaining problem (16)
taking Vp = Vp (Qm) ; Vw = Vw (Qm) and Vb = Vb (Qm) as given, (ii) Vp; Vw; Vb and Vs
solves the optimality conditions (5)-(8) under constraint (13), taking Qm as given.
The following proposition holds true:
Proposition 1 An admissible monetary equilibrium exists if and only if   1=(1 + r):
If    (r) ; where  (r) is a decreasing function of r, the reNBS Qm is unique and
solves the unconstrained version of problem (16). If  (r) <   1=(1 + r) the inequality
constraint in (16) is binding and Qm = Qm:
Proof. First of all we observe that an admissible monetary solution Qm must belong
to

0; Qm

; where this last subset is a non-empty set if and only if   1=(1 + r): Let
us suppose now that the inequality constraint in problem (16) is not binding. From the
rst order condition for the unconstrained version of (16) we derive:
qm =
1
2
+
Vw (Qm)  Vp (Qm)
2
= f (Qm) (17)
where, from optimality conditions (5)-(8), we have:
Vp =
Qm
r (r + 2)
; Vw =
 [1 Qm   (r + 1) ]
r (r + 1 + )
(18)
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It is immediate to prove that f is a continuous di¤erentiable function with @f=@Qm < 0:
Therefore, we can rule out multiple solutions. However, we still have to prove the
existence of an admissible unconstrained solution. From (17) we have f (0) > 0; as a
consequence, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of an unconstrained
solution is f
 
Qm
  Qm. This implies, as a matter of fact, that the decreasing curve
f (Qm) intersects the 450 line at some point between 0 andQm, i.e. that an unconstrained
solution to f (Q) = Q exists: Note that if Qm = Qm we have Vw = 0 and, from (17), we
obtain:
qm =
1
2

1  Qm
r (r + 2)

Hence, an admissible unconstrained reNBS exists if and only if:
1
2

1  Qm
r (r + 2)

 Qm ,  
(r + 1)
2 (r + 1)2   1 =  (r) (19)
where  (r) is a decreasing function of r. On the contrary, if  >  (r) the function f (Q)
never intersects the 450 line before Qm and the constraint of problem (16) becomes
binding. In this last case, the reNBS Qm is simply determined by the constraint, i.e.
Qm = Qm:
We conclude that if, for a given intertemporal preference rate r, the working disutility
 is not too high or, for a given labour disutility , agents are su¢ ciently patient (r is
not too high) an admissible monetary equilibrium always exists. The interpretation of
Proposition 1 is quite intuitive. In a monetary economy nor producers neither active
workers can consume output immediately. They have to go to the exchange sector as a
sellers and as a buyers respectively. In particular, with reference to active workers, the
cost of delaying consumption depends on r; and if this cost is too high, relative to their
disutility ; the monetary exchange system may not be viable.
2.4 Existence of a Monetary Equilibrium
In the previous sections we assumed that producers always decide to o¤er a monetary
contract. In other words, we assumed the monetary equilibrium and we proved that
this equilibrium can be consistent with the individualsrationality constraints. In order
to prove the existence of the monetary equilibrium we have to verify that there is no
room for a deviating contract. More specically, we have to characterize the conditions,
if any, under which, in a monetary economy, no entrepreneur has incentive to o¤er a
co-operative contract instead of a monetary contract.
Before analyzing the existence problem it will be useful to introduce the following
result:
Proposition 2 A permanent deviation from the monetary contract is an optimal strat-
egy if and only if a single deviation from the monetary contract is protable.
Proof. The instantaneous pay-o¤ of a producer is bounded below, therefore we can
apply the unimprovability criterion of dynamic programming. Suppose that a single
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deviation form a monetary contract is protable. As a consequence, the strategy that
prescribe to do not deviate from the monetary contract is improvable in a single step.
However, given the stationarity of the value function Vp; this implies that any nite
deviation strategy is improvable in a single step and the only unimprovable, i.e. optimal
strategy, is to permanently deviate from the monetary contract. Suppose, now, that
a permanent deviation strategy is optimal. This implies that the monetary strategy is
improvable in a single step, i.e. that a single deviation from the monetary contract is
always protable.
There are two main implications of Proposition 2. The rst one is that if a producer
decides to deviate from the monetary contract then he decides to deviate permanently;
as a consequence we can restrict our attention to the permanent deviation strategy.
The second one is that in order to check for the protability of a permanent deviation
strategy we can simply check the protability of a single deviation strategy.
Let us dene qc as the quantity traded in a single co-operative arrangement. A
deviating producer obtains the pay-o¤ V cp (Qc)+ qc; where V
c
p = Qc=r denotes the value
function of a producer who decides to o¤er always a co-operative contract and Qc is
the quantity he expects to obtain under a co-operative arrangement. The corresponding
active worker pay-o¤ is Vw (Qm) + 1  qc   : The value qc is endogenously determined
as a solution of the following optimization problem:
max
qc
 
V cp + qc

(Vw + 1  qc   ) (20)
s.t. qc < 1  
First order condition for the unconstrained problem (20) leads to the following best reply
function:
qc =
1
2
+
Vw   V cp
2
  
2
= g (Qc; Q

m) (21)
The best reply function depends on the equilibrium value Qm and on Qc: As before, ra-
tional expectation assumption implies qc = Qc = Qc : However, di¤erently from problem
(16), we can now prove that the reNBS for problem (20) is always unconstrained.
Lemma 1 For every Qm there is always a unique value 0 < Qc < 1    such that
Qc = g (Qc ; Qm)
Proof. First of all, we observe that g is a continuous di¤erentiable function, and
@g=@Qc < 0: Moreover g (0; Qm) = (1=2) [Vw + 1  ] > 0 and, remembering equations
(18), we have g (1  ;Qm) < 1   . This means that a unique value 0 < Qc < 1   
always exists such that Qc = g (Qc ; Qm) :
It is also interesting to note that g (Qm; Qm) < f (Qm) = Qm and this implies that
Qc < Qm: At the equilibrium, the deviating co-operative contract returns a quantity
lower than the quantity obtained in a monetary contract. This is because the two
contractual problems take place at di¤erent stages; there is a di¤erent matching sequence
involving di¤erent subjects. In a deviating co-operative contract the producer bargain
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with an active worker who is su¤ering a disutility . In a monetary contract the seller
bargains with a buyer who has already paid the disutility cost . As a consequence, the
reservation pay-o¤ of an active worker is higher than the reservation pay-o¤ of a buyer.
However, the inequality Qc < Qm does not imply, by itself, that a deviation from the
monetary contract is not protable. In particular, we can state that a deviation from
the monetary contract will be not protable if and only if:
V cp  Vp
Where, from the optimality conditions (5)-(8), the above inequality can be written as:
Qm
r + 2
 Qc (22)
We dene a sustainable monetary equilibrium as an admissible monetary equilibrium
such that condition (22) is always satised.
Proposition 3 Consider an unconstrained admissible monetary equilibrium. Hence, a
sustainable monetary equilibrium always exists if and only if  2 A (; r)  R+ where
A (; r) = f;' (r; )     (r)g and ' (r; ) is an increasing function of r.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that a monetary equilibrium is admissible and
unconstrained if and only if    (r). Let us consider now a permanent deviation from
the monetary contract. From Proposition 2 we know that a permanent deviation is
protable if and only if a single deviation is protable. Denote Qc (1) as the equilibrium
quantity obtained under a single deviation strategy. From (17) and (21) we have
Qc (1) = Q

m  

2
This implies that the deviation is protable if and only if
Qm  

2
>
Qm
r + 2
We conclude that a protable deviation from the monetary contract does not exist if
and only if
Qm  

2
 Q

m
r + 2
, Qm 

2

r + 2
r + 1

(23)
From equation (17) we can calculate the value Qm as a function of the parameters r; 
and 
Qm =
(r + 2) [r +  (1  )]h
2 (r + 1)2   1

+  (2 (r + 1) + 1)
i (24)
Substituting on we obtain:
  2 (r + 1) (r + )
2 (r + 1)2   1 +  [4 (r + 1) + 1] = ' (r; ) (25)
and it is simply a matter of algebra to verify that @' (r; ) =@r > 0:
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Proposition 4 Consider a constrained admissible equilibrium. Hence, a sustainable
monetary equilibrium always exists if and only if  2 B (r)  R+; where B (r) =
f; (r) <    (r)g and  (r) is an increasing function of r:
Proof. From Proposition 1, we know that a monetary equilibrium is admissible and
constrained if and only if  (r) <   1=(1+ r): Moreover at the constrained equilibrium
we have Qm = Qm: Hence, the equilibrium quantity obtained by a single deviating
producer is
Qc (1) =
1
2
(1  )  Qm
2r (r + 2)
and the sustainability condition becomes
Qm
r + 2
 1
2
(1  )  Qm
2r (r + 2)
, Qm 
r (r + 2) (1  )
2r + 1
Remembering that Qm = 1  (1 + r) ; the previous one can be rewritten in the following
way
   
 
r2   1
r (r + 1) + 1
=  (r)
where @=@r < 0 and  (r) < 1=(1 + r) for every r:
Proposition 5 A sustainable monetary equilibrium always exists if and only if  2
A (; r) [ B (r)  R+:
Proof. It follows immediately from Propositions 3 and 4.
Proposition 5 characterizes the monetary equilibrium. In particular, it states that,
for a given r and , the working disutility  must be neither too high nor too low. If  is
too high the active workersparticipation constraint could be violated and the monetary
equilibrium would be not admissible; if  is too low producers can not take su¢ cient
advantage from the monetary contract and the monetary equilibrium, even if admissible,
is not sustainable. However, we can not be sure that such a  e¤ectively exists: In order
to prove that we have to prove that A (; r) and B (r) are non-empty sets:
Proposition 6 A (; r) is a non-empty set if and only if r  1=2. Moreover, if 0 < ;
A (; r)  A (0; r)
Proof. Let us consider the particular case  = 1: Then:
' (r; 1) =
r + 1
r + 3
It is quite easy to verify that ' (r; 1) has the following properties:
@' (r; 1)
@r
> 0; ' (0; 1) =
1
2
< 1 =  (0) ; lim
r!1' (r; 1) = 1 > limr!1 (r) = 0
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As a consequence, a single value r always exists such that if r < r, ' (r; 1) <  (r); if
r > r, ' (r; 1) >  (r) and if r = r, ' (r; 1) =  (r) : In particular, we nd
' (r; 1) =  (r) , r = 1
2
= r
Therefore, if r  1=2, ' (r; 1) <  (r) and A (1; r) is a non-empty set. Let us now dene
the following function:
H (; r) = ' (r; 1)  ' (r; )
From (25) we obtain:
H (; r) =
(r + 1) (1  ) (1  2r)
(r + 3)
n
2 (r + 1)2   1 +  [4 (r + 1) + 1]
o
and we can easily verify that the function H () has the two following properties:
H (; r)  0 , r  1
2
and  2 (0; 1) ; @H (; r)
@
< 0
this implies that if r  1=2 the set A (; r) is non-empty and that for 0 < ; we have
A (0; r)  A (; r) :
Proposition 7 B (r) is a non-empty set if and only if r  1=2:
Proof. B (r) is non-empty if and only if    (r) : However, the condition    (r) is
always satised if and only if r  1=2
Figure 1 illustrates how the set A (; r) [ B (r) varies with  and r: The dotted
area identies the parameters set consistent with unconstrained admissible monetary
equilibria while the dashed area describes the set of costrained monetary equilibria.
As  increases, the set associated to unconstrained equilibria enlarges, while the set
of constrained equilibria does non depend on : The intuition is as follows: when 
approaches to one the economy moves towards a full employment status. This implies
that Vw increases and, because of that, the deviating producer is able to extract more
surplus form the workers. As a consequence, the monetary equilibrium becomes less
credible.
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Constrained
set
Unconstrained
set
δ
r
a(r)
Ф(r)
φ(r,g=1)
φ(r,g<1)
1/ (1+r)
1/2
Figure 1: the set A (; r) [ B (r)
A nal remark, in this section, concern the behavior of Qm with respect to : It is
quite easy to verify that, if r  1=2; i.e. if a sustainable monetary equilibrium exists,
we have @Qm=@ > 0 (see equation (24)): This implies that the monetary price, given
by 1= (1 Qm), increases as the economy moves towards a full employment status. In
this sense we obtain a procyclical monetary price behavior which can be rationalized as
follows. As  increases Vw also increases; active workers, because of the unemployment
rate reduction, are in a state better than before. At the same time this improvement
weakens the workersbargaining position in the commodity market and producers can
take advantage of this obtaining an higher monetary price.
3 The Generalized Economy
In the above economy, the existence of a monetary equilibrium crucially depends on the
introduction of a positive labour disutility cost : If  were equal to zero, or even if it
were too small, the monetary equilibrium would collapse. The reason is quite simple:
the sustainability of a monetary equilibrium depends on the fact that in a monetary
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contractual arrangement the bargaining process takes place at a di¤erent stage with
respect to a co-operative contractual arrangement. In particular, in a monetary economy
entrepreneurs and workers bargain after the production stage, that is in a stage where
workers are free from the labour disutility cost : Obviously, if  = 0 this di¤erence
ceases to be relevant.
However, a monetary and a co-operative economy di¤er not only because agents
bargain at di¤erent stage, but also because they bargain in di¤erent sectors. In the
previous model we assumed that the bargaining power of a producer is equal to the
bargaining power of a seller and this prevents us to analyze the consequences of this
last kind of heterogeneity. If we want to appreciate this point we have to generalize
the model allowing for heterogeneous bargaining powers across sectors. Therefore, in
this section we extend the analysis introducing, in an otherwise unaltered environment,
a generalized Nash bargaining solution concept. In order to simplify the algebra, we
restrict our attention to a full employment economy, i.e. we set  = 1:
With reference to the monetary contract, the quantity exchanged in a single match
solves now the following problem:
max
qm
(Vp + qm)
 (Vw + 1  qm)1  (26)
s.t. Vw   Vb + 1  qm  0
where 0    1 is the sellers bargaining power, which can now be di¤erent from 1=2.
The rst order condition for the unconstrained problem (26) leads to the following
generalized best reply function.
qm =  + Vw   (1  )Vp = F (Qm) (27)
Note that if, as in the previous section,  = 1=2; (27) is equivalent to (17).
Resorting to equations (18) with  = 1; we can rewrite (27) in the following form:
qm () =  + 

1 Qm   (r + 1) 
r (r + 2)

  (1  )

Qm
r (r + 2)

= F (Qm)
As before, a xed point for the best reply function identies the generalized rational
expectation bargaining solution (reGNBS) Qm () : We can now generalize Proposition
1 as follows.
Proposition 8 An admissible monetary equilibrium for the generalized economy exists
if and only if   1= (1 + r). If    (r; ) ; where  is a decreasing function of ;
the reGNBS Qm () is unique and solves the unconstrained version of problem (26): If
 >  (r; ) the inequality constraint of problem (26) is binding and Qm () = Qm
Proof. We will follow the same procedure adopted in Proposition 1. Let us assume
that the constraint in problem (26) is never binding. It is quite easy to verify that
@F=@Qm < 0 and F (0) > 0: In order to prove the existence of a unique unconstrained
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reGNBS Qm () we have to prove that F
 
Qm
  Qm. Remember that if Qm = Qm,
Vw = 0: As a consequence
F
 
Qm

=    (1  )

Qm
r (r + 2)

and F
 
Qm
  Qm if and only if
  (1 + r) [1   (1 + r)]
1 + r    =  (r; )
where @=@ < 0. On the contrary, if  >  (r; ) there is no value Qm such that
F
 
Qm
  Qm (the function F (Qm) never intersects the 450 line at Qm  Qm). The
inequality constraint of problem (26) is always binding and Qm () = Qm: However,
because of the non-negativity constraint on Qm; we also need   1=(1 + r):
The introduction of a generalized bargaining process weakens the constraint on labour
disutility : Even if  >  (r) we are now still able to identify an unconstrained admissible
monetary equilibrium; the increased labour disutility can be compensated by a decreased
sellers bargaining power.
At the same time, we have a new constraint on : If the sellers bargaining power is
too high, the workersparticipation constraint can be violated and this last ones have
no incentive to subscribe the monetary contract. It is interesting to note that if  = 0;
 = 1 and this means that there is no constraint on sellers bargaining power. In other
words, if the labour disutility is equal to zero, the constraint of problem (26) will be
never binding.
To conclude this section, we can compute the equilibrium value Qm () which is
given by
Qm () =
 (r + 1  )
(r + 1)
= 2Qm (28)
As expected, Qm () is an increasing function of  and if  > 1=2; Qm () > Qm:
3.1 Monetary equilibrium
As in section 1, in order to prove the existence of a sustainable monetary equilibrium
we have to verify that a deviation from the monetary contract is not protable. In the
generalized setting the quantity qc contracted in a single match by a deviating producer
solves the following problem:
max
qc

V dp + qc

(Vw + 1  qc   )1  (29)
s.t. qc < 1  
where 0    1 denotes the producers bargaining power and V dp and Vw are taken as
given. Because production and exchange sectors are distinct sectors, there is no general
reason to assume that the producers bargaining power is equal to the sellers bargaining
power. As a consequence, we allow for  6= .
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The rst order condition for the unconstrained version of problem (29) is
qc =  + Vw   (1  )V dp    (30)
where
Vw =
1 Qm ()  (r + 1) 
r (r + 2)
and V dp =
Qc
r
Therefore, we can rewrite the rst order condition as follows
qc =  + 

1 Qm ()  (r + 1) 
r (r + 2)

  (1  )Qc
r
   = G (Qm () ; Qc) (31)
To identify the rational expectation equilibrium value Qc we have to look for a xed
point for (31). However, in this case, we have to distinguish between constrained and
unconstrained solutions.
Lemma 2 For every  2 [0; 1) a value 0 <  <  always exists such that: (i) if
    1 there is always a unique value 0  Qc  1  such that Qc = G (Qm () ; Qc) ;
(ii) if 0   <  the rational expectation solution for problem (29) is constrained and
Qc = 1  
Proof. First of all, we observe that G (Qm () ; Qc) is a continuous function with
@G=@Qc < 0 and G (Qm () ; 0) > 0. It follows that for a given value Qm () we
have min fG (Qm () ; Qc)g = G (Qm () ; 1  ) : Consider now G (Qm () ; 1  ) and
suppose that   : Hence
G (Qm () ; 1  ) = G (Qm () ; 1  ) = (1  )

 (r + 1)  1
r

< 1  
However, if G (Qm () ; 1  ) < 1   ; by continuity there is always a unique value
 <  such that if   ; G (Qm () ; 1  ) < 1   ; but this means that, under
the previous restriction on ; there is always a unique value 0  Qc  1    such that
Qc = G (Qm () ; Qc) : Point (ii) is straightforward.
The unconstrained solution for (29) can be obtained from (31) and gives
Qc = 
24(r + 1)
h
(r + 1)2 (1  )  r
i
   [r + 1  ]
(r + 2) (r + 1  ) (r + 1)
35 (32)
The following proposition states that the constrained solution can not be consistent with
a sustainable monetary equilibrium. This happens because Qc is too high with respect
to Qm () :
Proposition 9 If the solution for problem (29) is constrained, a sustainable monetary
equilibrium for the generalized economy never exists.
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Proof. As we know, the solution for problem (29) is constrained if and only if 0   <
: Under this circumstance, the sustainability condition is
Qm ()
r + 2
> 1   ,  > (1  ) (r + 1) (r + 2)
r + 1   = e
It is immediate to verify that e > . However  <  )  < e and the sustainability
condition can be never satised.
Hence, in order to look for a sustainable monetary equilibrium we can restrict our
attention to the unconstrained solutions set.
Proposition 10 For every 0    1= (1 + r), r > 0 and 0    h (; r) ; a sus-
tainable monetary equilibrium for the generalized economy always exists if and only if
  H (r; ) where H (r; ) and h (; r) are decreasing functions of :
Proof. From Proposition (9) we need   : By equation (32), the sustainability
condition Qm= (r + 2)  Qc can be written in the following way
  
"
(r + 1)2 (1  )  r
(r + 1  )
#
= H ()
It is quite easy to verify that @H () =@ < 0; moreover, it is possible to prove that
H ()   for every admissible  ( (see appendix A.2) so that our initial assumption
holds true. However, the previous condition does not prove that a sustainable monetary
equilibrium exists for a non empty parameters space, that is H (r; )  . In other
words, we have to verify that the inequality H (r; )   holds true for a signicant
restriction. After some algebra we obtain H (r; )   ,
  (1 + r)   (r + 1)
2
(1 + r)   (r + 1)2 + r (r + 1  ) = h (r; )
where @h=@ < 0 and h (r; )  0:
The rst thing that we have to note is that while in a non-generalized full-employment
economy the assumption  = 0 destroys the monetary equilibrium, in a generalized
economy a sustainable monetary equilibrium exists even if we assume a zero labour
disutility.
Proposition 11 Suppose that  = 0 and r > 0: Then a sustainable monetary equilib-
rium exists if and only if  2 [0; 1= (1 + r)] and   (1 + r) 
Proof. It follows immediately from Proposition 10
As we have seen, if  = 0; the labour disutility e¤ect becomes irrelevant. However, in
presence of heterogeneous bargaining power, the monetary contract can be still robust
to a co-operative deviation. This last result is entirely due to the fact that a monetary
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arrangement involves not only a di¤erent bargain timing, but also di¤erent sectors with
respect to a co-operative economy. Even if producers can not take advantage from the
rst di¤erence, they can still take advantage from the second one, provided that their
bargaining power in the exchange sector is su¢ ciently high relative to their bargaining
power in the production sector.
More in general, the e¤ect due to the existence of heterogeneous bargaining weights
adds to the monetary illusion e¤ect. This makes the monetary equilibrium more robust
and, at the same time, implies that the two e¤ects are substitute. From Proposition
10 we know that H (r; ) is a decreasing function of : If we strengthen the labour
disutility e¤ect, the threshold value for  decreases and the monetary equilibrium can
be consistent with a sellers bargaining power lower than before. In particular, we observe
that if  > (r + 1) = (r + 3) ; H (r; ) < 1 and this implies that a monetary equilibrium
could exist even if the producersbargaining power in the exchange sector is lower than
their bargaining power in the production sector.
4 E¢ ciency
In the previous sections we proved that, under interpretable parameters restrictions, a
monetary equilibrium is sustainable. This means that if we start from a monetary equi-
librium no producer has incentive to deviate from the monetary contractual arrangement.
However we may ask if the entrepreneurs could prefer a monetary contract also from an
ex ante perspective.
The monetary equilibrium is, undoubtedly, ine¢ cient because it implies a longer
chain of transactions without any social advantage. As a matter of fact, production can
not be increased and the monetary contract reduces the dimension of the production
sector.
However, even if the monetary equilibrium can not be a rst best, it can be still ex-
ante optimal for the entrepreneurs. In our framework, the contractual arrangement is
an entrepreneursprerogative and, from their point of view, the monetary contract can
be preferred because they can take advantage from surplus distribution. The question
is whether the ine¢ ciency loss may be compensated by the gain from trade earned
by the entrepreneurs or not. In order to explore this question we have to compare
the producers value function in a co-operative economy to their corresponding value
function in a monetary economy.
The optimality conditions in a co-operative economy simplies to the following couple
of Bellmann equations.
rV cp = Qce
rV cw = 1 Qce   
where Qcp is determined as a xed point of the following best reply function (see equation
(30))
qc =  + 
(1 Qc   )
r
  (1  ) Qc
r
  
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If  2 [0; 1= (1 + r)] ; there is always a stationary solution for the previous equation
and, in particular, we obtain Qce = (1  ) :
The monetary equilibrium will be preferred ex-ante to the co-operative one if and
only if Vp  V cp , i.e. Qm () = (r + 2)  (1  ) : From equation (28) we obtain the
following condition:
 

(1  ) (r + 1) (r + 2)
r + 1  

 = B (r; )  (33)
We conclude that if the sellers bargaining power is su¢ ciently high relative to the
producersbargaining power, the ine¢ ciency loss implied by a monetary contract will
be more than compensated by the gain from surplus distribution. Moreover, we observe
that B (r; )  H (r; ); in order to obtain an ex-ante optimal monetary equilibrium
we have to increase the threshold value for : At the same time, @B (r; ) =@ < 0; the
labour disutility e¤ect allow us to weaken the restriction on : In particular we have
min fB (r; )g = (1 + r) so that, even in the most favorable case, we need  > :
This last result claries one point. The labour disutility e¤ect plays a major role in
an ex post perspective, that is once we are placed in a monetary equilibrium. In this
case the producers who o¤er a monetary contract have a competitive advantage with
respect to a deviating producer who o¤ers a co-operative contract, simply because this
last one bargains over q with active workers having the same expected utility but also a
positive labour disutility cost. On the contrary, if we look at an ex ante perspective, the
monetary illusion e¤ect ceases to be crucial, at least as an absolute argument in favour
of the monetary contract, and the heterogeneous bargaining powers e¤ect comes to the
fore.
5 Conclusions
We studied a search theoretic model where agents are heterogeneous with respect to the
role played in the economic system. Entrepreneurs hold a dominant role, as they have an
exclusive access to the credit system and can decide about the transaction strategy used
to carry out production. On the contrary, workers play a residual role as they can only
decide whether to participate or not to production and exchange activity. This appears
to be a substantial departure from the standard search theoretic framework, insofar as
the monetary solution is driven essentially by the objective function of a single class of
agents.
In absence of a double coincidence of wants problem, the co-operative technology
dominates the monetary transaction technology unambiguously. This happens because:
(a) the single production levels are constant by assumption, (b) money wastes time in-
volving a longer transaction chain. Nevertheless, the surplus distribution depends on
transaction technology and this is a crucial argument for the existence of a monetary
equilibrium. Money is created and destroyed, de facto, by the entrepreneurs, whereas
the bank act only as a policeman to avoid opportunistic behavior. As a consequence, in
order to look for a rationale for money we have to look at entrepreneursincentives. If
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entrepreneurs can take a large enough advantage from a monetary transaction technol-
ogy, without extracting all the surplus from workers, the monetary equilibrium becomes
a credible outcome.
In particular we identied two factors which explain the existence of a monetary
equilibrium: the labour disutility cost and the relative sellers bargaining power. An
increase in the labour disutility reduces the entrepreneursoutput share in a monetary
as well as in a co-operative economy. At the same time it makes less plausible a deviation
from the monetary contract. This happens because of the labour disutility e¤ect which
causes a relative increase in the real wage to be paid in a deviating co-operative contract.
The relative bargaining power of the seller has a direct positive e¤ect on the output
share of the entrepreneurs. There are two threshold levels for the relative bargaining
power of the seller, H (r; ) and B (r; ). If the sellers bargaining power is larger that
the rst one but less than the second one, we can state that the monetary equilibrium
is robust to co-operative deviations. If it is higher that the second one, entrepreneurs
would prefer the monetary equilibrium also from an ex ante perspective. More precisely,
the e¢ ciency loss due to the extension of the transaction chain will be more than com-
pensated by the gain in term of output share. Moreover, the monetary illusion e¤ect and
the relative bargaining power e¤ect are substitute. An increase in the labour disutility
costs reduces both of the threshold values H (r; ) and B (r; ) :
Appendix
The relationship between H () and 
We have to prove that   H () for every admissible : The value  can be obtained
imposing the condition G (Qm () ; 1  ) = 1   and solving for : After some algebra
we obtain
 =
(r + 1) [1   (r + 1)]
r + 1    

1  

"
(1  ) (1 + r)2 (r + 2)
r + 1  
#
= ()
Note that  is an increasing continuous function of  and if  = 0;  < 0 while if
 = 1;  > 0: This means that a value  exists such that  = 0 if  = ;  < 0 if
 < ; and  > 0 if   : The function  can be now redened in the following
way
 =

() if   
0 if  < 
The value H () is given by
H () = 
"
(r + 1)2 (1  )  r
(r + 1  )
#
Let us now dene the function () = H ()   : It is immediate to verify that
()  0 for  2 [0; ) ; () > 0, and (1)  0 for every 0    1= (1 + r) :
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Moreover
@()
@
< 0 for every  2 [; 1]
It follows that ()  0 for every admissible  and this means that the inequality
  H () is always satised. 
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